After starting The Myth of the Rational Voter on the airplane to Oregon back in June, I finally finished the last couple of chapters this weekend at the beach. PROTIP: Don't go to the gulf coast in August, wait for October, the heat won't be as bad.
My overall impression is that Caplan has a fairly novel (to economics) hypothesis about why democracies end up with bad policies in many cases. The typical political economy story sort of rests on the Self-Interested Voter Hypothesis (SIVH) and it goes like this: Voters vote in their own interest, and choose politicians that will try to meet those interests. However, because of perverse incentives in government, and the relative lack of a reason for one voter to vote, politicians often don't carry out the will of the voters very well or are beholden to special interests and we therefore get bad policy.
Caplan's hypothesis, which he lays out pretty well with empirical grounding, is a whole lot simpler: the bad policies that we get are popular due to a combination of factors. The main factors that Caplan points to are altruistic voting and a lack of economic understanding on the part of the voters. Essentially, people vote in ways they think will help maximize social welfare, but because they have false beliefs about which policies will do that, and little incentive to learn because the value of one vote is so small, we end up with well-intentioned but harmful policies. He also covers various biases that lead to these false beliefs.
I think the most interesting points in the book are those that deal with the empirical evidence against the SIVH and those outlining the various biases (anti-market, anti-foreign, pessimistic, and one other that I can't remember right now). On the whole, I think Caplan's book is an important step in understanding the various failings of democratic systems, and for helping laypersons grasp how popular majorities can enforce very harmful policies. One great advantage of the book is that the technical detail is there in the index and appendix if you want it, but largely summarized in the actual text, making it accessible to pretty much anyone with a basic grasp of economic concepts.
Overall rating: 17/19
Whenever I catch so much as a glimpse of pr0n, I suddenly turn into a sex-crazed barbarian, slashing and clawing my way through whatever and whomever until I find something to put my weiner into. -- Taktix
Re: Myth of the Rational Voter
SIVH, not to be confused with SIV (that cockbaiting ass).
PJ O'Rourke once observed that voters were more likely to vote for programs that provided them with gains whereas voters were less likely to vote against programs that had low individual costs. I believe that he used [insert band name here, Pearl Jam methinks] CDs as an example. If there was a program up for a vote that promised everyone who wanted a Pearl Jam CD would get one for free. Now, there's a pretty good incentive to vote for that if you wanted a free Pearl Jam CD (let's say $16). On the other hand, those who do not want a Pearl Jam CD face a relatively low cost if the measure passes (all free CDs/total tax base). Therefore, Pearl Jam voters had a higher incentive to vote for the program than non-Pearl Jam voters. Consequently, the Free CD bill would pass a referendum.
Is this similar, in any way, to Caplan's argument?
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Re: Myth of the Rational Voter
I think it's related but not exactly the same. In fact, that kind of argument seems to be at the heart of the SIVH. Caplan's argument is more like: "Well, I want people who want Pearl Jam CDs to have them, and I think we should therefore provide them to people in need, so I'll vote for this measure." Like all those poor fucks in San Antonio who voted for a $450MM bond for ACCD and will never in their lives go there.
Whenever I catch so much as a glimpse of pr0n, I suddenly turn into a sex-crazed barbarian, slashing and clawing my way through whatever and whomever until I find something to put my weiner into. -- Taktix
Re: Myth of the Rational Voter
Just an aside: I've been to the Florida Gulf Coast a couple of times in August, and while it was hot and sunblock is needed, I recall it as less unpleasant than St. Louis in August, being less humid somehow (even though there's an ocean right there and everything).
Modified tip: Don't go to the gulf coast in August, wait for October, the heat won't be as bad. Unless you're from St. Louis, then you're still better off getting out of town in August and going to the Gulf Coast.
Carry on.
"My intellect is gigantic, monstrous, terrifying."
Re: Myth of the Rational Voter
I read, with confusion Timothy's post until I scrolled up and looke at mine. It should have read RE: SIVH . . . .
Yeah, that's what I meant. Thanks for the review Timothy. Does Caplan really come across as elitiest (in terms of economic education) as some of his critics have claimed?
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Re: Myth of the Rational Voter
GinSlinger: I don't think he comes across as elitist very much. Maybe a little, but I don't think saying, "people should learn about economics lest they vote for shitty policies and then complain about the results" is elitist. Maybe if you're some sort of democracy fetishist saying that comes across as elitist, and Caplan does spend a good portion of the latter chapters trying to disabuse people of their fetish for democracy. I think that probably rubs a lot of people, especially left-leaning people, exactly the wrong way as many of them take the results of voting as automatically correct.
You can totally borrow my copy if you want, it's only a few hundred pages.
Whenever I catch so much as a glimpse of pr0n, I suddenly turn into a sex-crazed barbarian, slashing and clawing my way through whatever and whomever until I find something to put my weiner into. -- Taktix